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1. Introduction 
It starts to rain and I open the umbrella or, if I don’t 
have one, I ask my colleague, who is walking with me, if he 
has an umbrella in the bag. Why do I do so? There are 
many ways to answer this question, but if I adopt the 
strategy to explain the causes of my acting or speaking by 
looking for the reasons that I have for doing it (for instance, 
I notice that it is raining and I don’t want to get wet), I 
commit myself to an explanation of a psychological kind 
(Davidson 1980).  
The following discussion tackles an internal 
problem of psychological explanations concerning the 
taxonomy (or categorization) of intentional contents. 
Intentional contents define what beliefs, desires, hopes, 
etc., are about. One believes that something is so-and-so 
(for instance, one believes that it is raining); one desires 
that something is going to be so-and–so (that tomorrow it 
isn’t going to rain), etc. The content of intentional states is 
the object of those so-called that-clauses: ‘it is raining’ is, 
for instance, the content of the belief that it is raining.  
Insomuch as the content of beliefs, desires etc. 
can only be expressed by use of propositions, 
psychological explanations are commonly framed in terms 
of propositional attitudes. The notion of a propositional 
attitude involves two components: on the one hand, the 
proposition that describes the intentional content; on the 
other hand, the attitudes one may have towards these 
contents (the attitude of believing something, of desiring 
something, of hoping for something, etc.). The idea behind 
this is that subjects will behave differently depending on 
both the specific attitude they have towards these contents 
(depending on whether they believe something or they 
desire something or they hope for something, etc.) and the 
peculiar content itself, which characterizes those attitudes. 
The particular topic that the present paper deals with does 
not concern the function of different attitudes, but the 
semantics of the propositions that describe the content of 
attitudes. In other words, this paper maintains, according 
to the view proposed by social externalism, that the 
semantic content of propositional attitudes are socially 
constituted by the linguistic practices of communities. 
Nevertheless, the paper also deals with a peculiar matter 
regarding social determination of content; namely, that not 
all subjective contents share the same semantic features, 
even if they seem to be determined by one and the same 
social constituted content. The goal is to show how a 
socially constituted content may ‘affect’ the contents of 
individual minds differently. The paper concludes with an 
assessment of the consequences that follow from this view 
with respect to psychological explanations. 
 
2. Individuation of Content from an 
Externalist Point of View 
The classical shape of the taxonomy problem is 
defined by the debate about the socalled ‘narrow’ and 
‘wide’ approach to intentional states, which was introduced 
chiefly by Saul Kripke’s, Hilary Putnam’s and Tyler Burge’s 
externalist theories of content (Putnam 1975, Kripke 1979, 
Burge 1979). Briefly, externalism maintains that certain 
intentional states, such as beliefs and desires, have 
contents that depend on factors external to the individual 
mind.  
I am not interested here in tracing the differences 
between the existing forms of externalism.1 Instead, I 
examine the externalist view insofar as it is relevant for 
delineating the taxonomy-problem in psychological 
explanation. This view consists basically in the social 
externalism proposed by Burge as well as by Putnam’s 
thesis of the ‘division of linguistic labor’. 2  
The essential features of social externalism can 
easily be shaped by using Burge’s famous arthritis 
example. If I give voice to my belief by stating, ‘I have 
arthritis’, the proposition ‘I have arthritis’ expresses the 
content of my belief, while the word ‘arthritis’ conveys the 
concept that determines what my content refers to. 
Contents are described by propositions that are made up 
by words. Words express the concepts that determine 
what contents are about. 
Social externalism maintains that the concepts 
occurring in sentences that describe intentional contents 
are constituted by the classification of the external world 
that a society develops through its experts and imposes 
through linguistic practices. This is to say that arthritis is 
what medical science and the doctors tell us it is, viz. only 
a disease of the joints.  
What would be the case, however, if I did not have 
any idea about how medical science describes arthritis, but 
I still believed that I had arthritis: if, for instance, I had no 
idea that arthritis is a disease of the joints and thought that 
the pain in my thigh is caused by arthritis?  
Putnam’s idea of the division of linguistic labor and 
Burge’s position differ on this matter. For Burge, social 
practices constitute the concepts that we use, and the 
socially constituted concepts are the only ones that 
actually exist. So, if I lack the concept of arthritis, I simply 
do not know (or, at least, do not know exactly) what I 
believe to be the case; for my belief is nothing more than a 
socially defined concept of arthritis.  
Unlike Burge, Putnam maintains that subjects do 
know what they think even if they don’t share the concept 
with the experts; they only identify these concepts on the 
basis of different criteria or properties. Putnam’s point is 
that for identifying (viz. taxonomizing) the peculiar 
concepts and related contents of subjects, one has to rely 
on the corresponding concepts determined by the experts. 
From this point of view, the analysis of content bifurcates 
into two differently determined notions,3 namely, the 
externalist (wide) and the subjective (narrow). On the one 
hand, there is a wide notion of content developed by 
externalism that points out how the individuation of 
                                                     
1 Among those the most relevant positions are social, physical, causal and 
causal-informational externalism. For a classification see Bilgrami 1992, 22-
26. 
2 Here externalism is considered exclusively as a theory of content. Other 
matters connected with it such as, for instance, the problem of supervenience 
are set aside.  
3 The notion of the ‘bifurcation’ of content is taken from Bilgrami (1992).  
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concepts and, therefore, the evaluation of contents 
depends on the external (physical and social) world, which 
exists beyond and before the individual mind; on the other 
hand, there is a narrow notion of content, which aims to 
taxonomize the specific contents of individual thought in 
order to describe behavior as the causal product of 
intentional contents. 
 
3. Semantic Features of Intentional 
Contents 
Psychological explanations in intentional terms 
rest, as Fodor points out (Fodor 1987, 33), on the idea that 
intentional states have causal power. The behavior of 
subjects (viz. language and action of subjects) is explained 
on the basis of the causal interaction of attitudes and 
contents. Inasmuch as psychological explanations concern 
subjective intentional contents, the relevant question is not 
what doctors say arthritis is, but how I intend arthritis when 
I believe that I have it. Because I do not know that arthritis 
is a disease of the joints only, I can believe to have arthritis 
in the thigh; and this belief is what matters for explaining 
my behavior on the basis of the causal power of my 
propositional attitudes. Thus, what is needed for a 
psychological explanation is an individuation of the 
properties that a subject associates with a certain concept 
and the semantics of his correspondent intentional 
contents. From the point of view of a psychological theory, 
the idea that subjects do not know what they think is 
nonsense, because a subjects’ behavior cannot be caused 
by a content, which the subject does not know. For this 
reason, we can suppose any kind of nebulously or wrongly 
individuated content, but we must say that subjects know 
what they think with it; otherwise, we must give up 
psychological explanations as well as the principle that 
grounds them, namely, that behavior of subjects is a 
causal product of their thought. 
The matter in question is how to determine the 
semantics of subjective contents. If I utter bona fide ‘I have 
arthritis,’ it is because I believe that ‘I have arthritis’. But 
this report of my beliefs must still be put in quotes because 
I don’t believe to have arthritis in the wide or social sense 
of arthritis as far as my doctor understands it. For 
taxonomizing my subjective content, one needs to 
disquote the proposition, which describes my belief in a 
way that identifies its semantics ‘objectively’. This is 
nothing but the old problem of intentional and extensional 
contexts. The natural suggestion for this problem seems to 
be Putnam’s: to evaluate subjective properties relying 
upon the properties that identify the concepts in a wide 
sense, which is to say relying upon the properties that the 
experts tell us to be the essential ones for determining 
objects in extensional sense.  
But in this respect we have to distinguish between 
two sides of the externalist view. On the one hand, there 
are the concepts and contents defined by scientific 
theories, which are based on structural properties of 
reality. These properties may identify the reference in an 
essential way: water is only and univocally H2O. This 
externalist view is most properly called ‘physical 
externalism’. Although physical externalism relates with 
social externalism as far as its concepts and contents 
influence social linguistic practices, linguistic practices and 
scientific theories are not the same. More precisely, social 
linguistic practices include the concepts constituted by 
different scientific theories as well as everyday 
classification of concepts based upon simple categories 
like the shape of objects or their features. A concept can 
be univocally determined only in the field of a theory, which 
sets up its own vocabulary. Social linguistic practices are 
juxtaposed onto the same linguistic frame of concepts 
constituted on the basis of different ‘fields of knowledge’, 
which describe the empirical world on the basis of different 
properties. For this reason, linguistic practices do not 
determine their own concepts in an univocal way. What the 
relevant properties are for determining a concept depend 
upon the context within which this concept is used.  
Social practices define many properties for 
identifying a concept, but none of them determines which 
features necessarily individuate it in every case. Concepts 
like ‘cat’ or ‘Oedipus’ are not characterized by an essential 
property, which is in every case the same.  Social uses 
offer many properties for individuating, for instance, the 
concept of ‘table’ or of ‘Oedipus,’ but no one determines 
univocally the concept of table or of Oedipus in the sense 
in which H2O determines the concept of water. As 
Davidson points out, there is no way to make sure that the 
individuals will ”pick out ‘the’ relation that constitutes 
knowing which object some object is” because ”any 
property of an object may, under suitable conditions, be 
considered the relevant identifier.” (Davidson 2001, 56) 
 
4. Concluding Remarks: Taxonomies and 
Psychological Explanations 
If, as the previous part points out, linguistic 
practices do not determine univocally which properties 
identify a concept, then different subjects may be affected 
by concepts in different ways. In this case, every property 
may be the relevant one for the individuation of subjective 
content. From this point of view, my concept of arthritis, for 
instance, may be identified on the basis of properties that 
have nothing to do with the medical definitions of arthritis, 
joints and thigh, even if they arise from the linguistic 
practices of my society. I may actually individuate every 
one of those three concepts through features that diverge 
from anatomic criteria.  
The taxonomical work, which has to be done in 
order to develop psychological explanations, consists, in 
this case, in pointing out the properties of the subjective 
content that are relevant for explaining a behavior as 
causal effect of propositional attitudes. Developing such an 
apparatus does not mean to be able to grasp the whole of 
the actual semantic features of subjective contents. The 
explanation elaborates, rather, the hypotheses about 
possible features of those contents, which may be the 
relevant ones for the aim of explaining a behavior. An easy 
way for solving Burge’s mystery regarding the belief of 
having arthritis in the thigh could be to hypothesize that the 
relevant properties for the determination of this belief is 
that arthritis causes pain and, therefore, this pain becomes 
the relevant property identifying this concept. 
Yet, psychological theories can only develop 
hypotheses. To identify subjective contents for the aims of 
a psychological theory is a tricky interpretative work. The 
difficulty of this kind of explanations depends on the fact 
that the taxonomies of subjective contents build on the 
language defined by the social practices, which does not 
determine its own concepts in a univocal way. Thus, the 
identification of the relevant properties that determinate a 
subjective content requires a definition of the ‘contextual 
variable’, viz. the ‘level of language’ or, as previously 
stated, the ‘field of knowledge’ to which a concept has to 
be attributed. 
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